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Peacemakers Along the DMZ: 
Non-Self Destruct Landmines in the 
Republic of Korea 
The need for land mines in Korea will remain the same without a change in 
the terrain or the proximity of either the threat or the enemy, unless we 
successfully find a viable, fully fielded alternative. 
prevent war, in particular by ~ ro recting 
American and South Ko rean forces and 
civi lians fro m being attacked by North 
Korea, thereby avoiding thousa nds of 
potential casualties.3 An argument_ for 
keeping the mine option is that the mmes 
are m anageable and can be regulated so 
that they maintain a military legitimacy 
and util ity but do not become instru-
ments against civilians (Rosenfeld 1995). 
by LTC Albert Marin, 
Assistant Chief of Staff of the 
Plans and Operations 
Division, U.S. Forces, Korea, 
and CPT Michael Litzelman, 
Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations 
Officer with Special 
Operations Command, Korea. 
Introduction 
AP landmines have caused thou-
sands of deaths and injuries to innocent 
c ivilians and peacekeeping forces long 
afte r the conclusion of conflic ts.' They 
have prevented economies from growing 
and contributed to political and societal 
breakdown throughout the world. Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
and Canada, who spearheaded the 1997 
Treaty to Ban Landmines, have framed 
the problem as a humanitarian issue, 
while rhe world's only superpower, the 
United States, has called for exceptions 
in the treaty based on legitimate concerns 
of national securi ty. The United States 
refused to sign rhe treaty due to legitimate 
military and national security requirements. 
The International C ommittee of the 
Red C ross (1 C RC) reported that rhe 
United Stares has ratified a measure to 
protect civilians from weapons of war, 
known as the Protocols of the Geneva 
Convention of 1977, "which reaffirmed 
and refi ned principles of h uman itarian 
law mandating that armed conflicts be 
conducted so as to inflict a minimum of 
suffering. The use of weapons causing 
unnecessary suffering or sup erfluous in-
jury and whose damaging effects are dis-
propo rtionate to their military purpose 
was prohibited, and parties in a confl ict 
were mandated to d istinguish between 
civilians and combatams. According to 
the Convention, land mines could be di-
rected only at military objectives, with all 
feasible precautions taken to protect ci-
vilians. Remotely delivered mines would 
not be used unless their locations were 
accurately recorded or fitted with an ef-
fective neutralizing mechanism. Records 
verifying the location of m ine fields were 
mandated .. . " (lCRC 1996). 
The United Stat es ratified the Con-
ve ntion on Co nventional Weapo ns 
(CCW) Amended Mines Protocol in 
M ay 1999. It required that mine fields 
containing non-self destructing AP mines 
be marked and monitored and that all 
AP mines be marked and detectable by 
standard d etec tion equipment. John 
Troxel l claims that these restrictions a re 
consistent with the standard operating 
procedures of the U.S. Armed Forces, and 
that ir strikes an appropriate balance be-
tween humanitarian concerns and m ili-
tary requirements (Troxell 2000).z 
While landmines cominue ro maim 
and kill large numbers of civilians around 
the world, rhey can , through deterrence, 
Although most of the mineflelds that 
compose the Ko rea Barrier System (KBS) 
have been installed by Republic of Korea 
(ROK ) forces, some have existed as fa r 
back as the Korean War. Infrequently, 
sp ring floods may move some of ~h e 
landmines from the DM Z to outlaytng 
areas. O ccasionally casual t ies occur from 
mines inserted du ri ng the war but swept 
to unmarked areas near or within the 
DMZ. Sold iers a re also rarely injured or 
killed while patrolling in the DMZ from 
these unmarked mines. The ROK Army 
upgrades, maintains and repai rs the ob-
stacles a nd barriers, marking th e 
mineficlds. This continued maintenance 
by the ROK helps ro diminish the pros-
pect of further deaths or injuries. 
T he marked landmines have enor-
mously ben efi ted the South Ko rean 
populace. IfNorrh Korea does att~ck the 
South, it could use the Seoul corndor , as 
it did during the Korean War. This natu-
ral corridor, including the Seoul inner city 
and suburbs, have an outlaying popula-
tion of over 22 million men, women and 
ch ildren. Wi t hou t the KBS, and the 
The Korea Barrier System (or KBS) consists of tactical obstacles t~ support the . 
defense of the Republic of Korea. It is an extensive, in dep_th and 1ntegra~ed senes of 
obstacles and barriers,including mine fields, concertina w1re and dragons teeth. 
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landmines that make up an integral part 
of this system, the 155 casualties since 
1990 would be dwarfed by the enormous 
and catastrophic inj uries and deaths 
caused by an unhindered invasion force. 
During the current observance of the 
50'h anniversary of the Korean War, a 
large parr of the defense of the Republic 
of Korea (ROK ) rel ies on Non-Self De-
struct "dumb " land mines (NSDL), which 
have been largely phased our of the U.S. 
inventory. Some NGOs think NSDLs are 
a threat against civilians, bur this paper 
will show rhe public that, in an area di-
viding two states that arc techn ically at 
war, when countries act in a responsible 
manner us ing NSDL, rhey can help to 
protect non-combatants by creating an 
envi tonmem of force protection and se-
cu rity, thereby preventing invasion and 
massive no n-combatant casualties. 
Military and Cost 
Effectiveness of NSDL 
Past internatio nal agreements have 
so far been unsuccessful in totally limit-
ing AP landmines, in parr because these 
mi nes have been considered legitimate 
weapons of war when used in accordance 
wi th the rules of armed conflict. Tradi-
tional ly, landmines have been used to 
protect military bases, missile sites and 
dem il itari zed zones. 
Most nations and groups seem rouse 
them because they are a cheap and readily 
accessible means of defense and because 
they are an easy way to protect and con-
tro l nati o nal borders and territories. 
Step hen Biddle bel ieves that landmines 
serve an important purpose for the mili-
tary: "T hey enab le defensive positions to 
be held successfully by smaller forces, 
permitting commanders to use their avail-
able resources more effi ciently. Mines are 
used to force attackers to reduce front-
ages and ro di rect those echelons inro 
prepared engagement areas where defen-
sive weapons can be cired for maximum 
effect. They increase an attacker's losses, 
both by inflicting direct damage on at-
tacking sold iers and veh icles and by in -
ducing attackers to slow down in the pres-
ence of enem y fire. They decrease rhe 
morale of the enemy, force a military force 
to move with extreme caution and reduce 
mi litary effi-
ciency" ( Biddle 
1994). Overall, 
mines provide an 
adequa te protec-
tion to military per-
sonnel in the field. 
-- -~ - - ... --::::: 
The constant 
and long-term 
threat rhat North Korea poses to 
the ROK demands the enduring 
protection afforded by NSD ATL 
and A PL. We remain at armistice, 
not peace; the military situation 
between North Korea and the 
RO K has not changed.4 l n fact, the 
North Korea military continues to grow 
in size, and improve by acquiring mod-
ern systems, and it conti nues to move the 
majority of its force in proximity to the 
Demil itarized Zone (DMZ). All ofrhesc 
actions potentially reduce warning rime 
of a North Korean attack, further neces-
sitating constant readiness. We continue 
to need NSD ATLand APL unril accept-
able al ternatives are fielded and in place. 
United Narions Command/Com-
b ined Forces Command (UNC/CFC) 
war plans depend heav ily on the exten-
sive employment of tactical obstacles ro 
disrupr, turn, fix an d block enemy-
mounred maneuvers in ways that enhance 
our direct and indi rect fire systems. The 
combat multip licatio n that the Korea 
Barrier System (KBS) affords our defend-
ing forces is fundamenral to halting an 
attack norrh of Seoul with the forces cur-
rently available. Mixed mine fields con-
sisting of both NSD ATL and APL are 
rhe backbone of rhe KBS. The effective-
ness of these m ixed mine fields is nor 
derived from the ATL alone. It is errone-
ous to consider ATLas a pure system-
they are doctrinally and pragmatically in-
separable from their APL counterpart. 
Any discussion of a war plan requirement 
fo r ATL also carries an implicit require-
ment for A PL. ATLs are rarely employed 
without accompanying APL. 
NSD APLs enable rhe Command to 
maintain an appropriate level of high 
readiness by having a portion of rhc mines 
installed roday with minimal risk to non-
combatants. The overwhelming majority 
of mine fields are in the General Our-
post Line (GOP) and the Forward Edge 
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The KBS is a critica l component in support of 
the combined forces command (CFC) for the 
Defense of the Korean Peninsula. The Republic 
of Korea (ROK) is very skilled in the employment 
and construction of the KBS. Holes for every 
mine are pre-dug, marked and fitted with a 
mold. 
of rhe Battle Area (FEBA) areas, which 
are not accessible to noncombatants. 
Maintaining installed mine fields along 
rhe GOP allows ROK Army units to 
complete rhe defensive preparations of the 
remaining FEBAs in minimal rime if hos-
ti lities occur. Again, the planning is based 
on rhe premise that we wi ll get 1-3 days' 
unambiguous warning of a North Korea 
attack. Without rhe existing mine fields be-
ing installed, there is absolutely no way rha r 
they could be installed in 24-72 hours. 
Further, the mine fields along rhe GOP 
serve as a visible and very real demonstra-
tion ofUNC/CFC's read iness and resolve 
to defend the ROK against aggression. 
Non-Self Destruct 
Landmines (NSDL) vs. 
Self-Destruct Landmines 
(SDL) 
NSD APLs are employed to achieve 
three primary functions. First, NSD APLs 
are used to fix, d isrupt or block an en-
emy dismounted attack. NSD APLs are 
employed along dismounted avenues of 
approach and are posi tioned so that they 
are covered by direct and indi rect artil-
lery. Second, NSD APLs are employed 
in areas of limited weapons coverage to 
break an enemy's dismounted assault on 
rhe defen der's pos it ion. Third, NSD 
APLs are used in conjunction with anti-
rank landm ines (ATL) as parr of mixed 
1
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mine fi elds. H ere, rhe NSD APLs are 
employed in a manner that pro tects the 
ATLs from easy detectio n and remo val. 
The employment of N SD APL-pure 
mine fields is absolu tely essential ro the 
success of the close fight . NSD APL -pur e 
m ine fields positio ned alo ng enemy dis-
mounted avenues of approach all ow the 
unit to d isrupt, fix or block enemy in-
fantry attacks in a way that enhances the 
effects of other d irect and ind irect fire 
systems. In the same way, employing 
NSD APL-pure mine fields as pro tective 
m ine fields is critical to breaking and re-
pell ing an enemy infantry assault on a 
unit position. It enhances force p rotec-
tio n and all ows the un it to concentrate 
the bulk of irs fi re elsewhere to defeat the 
larger arrack. 
Self-destructing APLs and AT Ls, as 
currently manufactu red, are ill-suited to 
rep lace conventi o nal NSD APLs and 
ATLs fo r several reasons specific to Ko-
rea. elf-destructing mines are mechani-
call y employed by ground, air and field 
artillery systems. Even when fi red o n fl at 
terrain, 5-1 5 percent of these mi nes end 
up with an "on edge" o rientation. That 
is to say that they do not lie flat on the 
ground; rather, rhey come ro rest o n one 
edge. Mines resting in th is configuration 
are rendered ineffective. T he terrain in 
Korea is steep slo pes and defi les with rela-
tively few Aar areas. The percentage o f 
m ines resting "on edge" will rise signifi-
cantly on Ko rean terrain. Mo re than I Oo/o 
of mines "on edge" degrade the effective-
ness of rhe m ine field. Also specific to 
Korea are rhe lo ng winrer seaso n and an-
nual summer monsoons. Self-desrrucring 
mi nes do not fare well in snow deeper 
than I 0 em . The mines freq uently come 
to rest "on edge," and tripwire employ-
men t on the AP m ines is frequently hin-
dered by the snow. Additio nally, as the 
snow melts, the m ines move and believe 
they are being tampered with , causing 
them to activate. Mud and heavy rain , 
common fallouts of rhe Korean monsoon 
season, create simi lar effects on the self-
destructing m ines. 
SOL mixed systems are nor a viable 
replacemenr fo r NSDLs in rhis theater. 
T hey do not p rovide rhe same level of 
advanced read iness and deterrence d ur-
ing armistice and do nor provide the same 
mi litary value during combat operatio ns. 
Finally, the current fam ily of SOL sys-
tems requ ires dedicatio n of scarce deliv-
ery means such as arrillery, USAF aircraft 
and helicopters that are criti cally needed 
elsewhere for destruction missions against 
a numerically superior e nemy. 
The lo ng dura t ion e ffect t hat 
NSDLs have on enemy maneuver is an 
essenrial component of rhe UN C/CFC 
sche me of defense. T hey allow ROK 
forces to fight this in itial barrie from suc-
cessive lines of defense in tw o ways. Since 
the effectiveness of N SDLs does nor ex-
pire wi th ri me, engineer units can install 
the mine field s and or her defensive works 
for success ive lines of defense while com-
bat units conrinue to figh t the close battle 
along the GOP. Also, the persisten t ef-
fect o f N SD L mixed m ine fields makes 
them mil itarily valuable well beyond the 
immediate close figh t. Because they re-
main lethal, NSDL mixed mine fi elds 
give the defending commander a unique 
abil ity ro attack the entire depth of the 
enemy wi th a single system. NSDL mine 
fields grea tly red uce rhe effectiveness and 
susrainabil ity of a Norrh Korea arrack by 
making it d iffi cult to qu ickly shi ft and 
comm it reserve fo rces, breaking the 
tempo of the arrack and d isrupting c riti-
cal re-supply operations. T hey also allow 
fri endly fo rce commanders to positio n 
fo rces as required on the ban lefield, en-
emy and siw arion dependent. 
Finally, NSDLs are p referred over 
SOL systems in the in itial phases o f de-
fensive preparation simply because rhe 
equipmen t needed to install them rap-
idly on a broad from-manpower-is 
more readily available. W hile the SOL 
systems may be mo re effecti ve in some 
instances, t hey require co m m in ing assets 
such as arri llery, USAF aircraft and hel i-
copters to deploy m ines rather than con-
d uct ing their primary m issions. These 
scarce assets will likely already be over-
co mm itted in the init ial phases of hos-
tilit ies. Tying up valuable artillery, aircraft 
and helicopters ro employ m ine fields sig-
ni ficantly degrades o ur abili ty to acco m-
pl ish other critical battlefield functio ns, 
such as counter-fire, deep anacks a nd 
command and control, o n which success 
also rests. Our current SOL mixed sys-
tems do not enab le rhe Command to 
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main tain such a deterrent and would nor 
provide a visible deterrent. 
ostly and Ill-suited 
andmine Alternatives 
T he United States is searching ag-
gress ively for alternatives to protect its AT 
m ines, such as actively exploring t he use 
o f AP mine alternat ives in place o f self-
destructing m ines and exploring the de-
velopment of o ther technologies t hat 
could result in alternatives that would 
enable the U nited States to el iminate its 
land mines entirely. 
Preside ntial D ecis ion Directive/Na-
tional Securi ty C ouncil (PDD / NSC)-64 
mandates the D epartment o f D efense 
(DoD ) to end use of all "pur e" APLs our-
side of Korea by 3 1 D ecember 2003, ag-
gress ively pu rsue APL al ternatives (APL-
A) fo r Korea by 3 1 December 2006 (ob-
jective), and seek alternatives to AP sub-
munitions in mixed AT systems and/or 
the enti re mixed AT system. 
H owever, C harles Kraurhammer, a 
noted polit ical colu mnist, believes rhar 
rhe old "du mb" mines the United States 
does not manufacture are still imporrant 
" in maintaining the peace in Korea along 
the D MZ to deter the wo rld 's most 
heavily fo rtified , most aggress ive and 
most unpredi ctable country-North 
Ko rea. Since no one lives in the DMZ, 
the o n ly people who are going to get 
blown up treading on American m ines 
are Norr h Korean infi lt rators or N orrh 
Korean battalions headed south to kill our 
so ld iers. Today, 37,000 U.S. troops and 
their UN and South Korean all ies face a 
m illio n North Korean troops o n ly 27 
miles from Seoul. In rhe event o f an at-
tack, the N orrh's overwhelming numeri-
cal advantage can be countered on ly by 
slowi ng irs advance by AP land m ines," 
(Kraurhammer 1997). John Troxell adds 
that American ad versaries will seek, in 
futu re wars, ro either operate in co mplex 
terrain or attempt ro offset U .S. ad van-
tages. "AP land mines and mixed anti-tank 
sys t e ms wil l be c ri t ica l i n su c h a 
fight. .. that without AP m ines, U.S. sol-
d iers will be placed at increased risk" 
(Troxell 2000 ). Gino Str ada believes that 
most of the land mine injuries to civil-
ians are rhe result of increasingly indis-
• 
c nm111 ate use o f small antiperson nel 
m ines by irregu lar or poo rly disciplined 
armies in the developing world (Scien-
ti fic American 1996). The United Stares 
uses land mines in a respo nsible ma nner 
ro prevent non-combatants from becom-
ing injured or killed. 
To day, rh e reality is that success of 
this theater in deterring and, if necessary, 
defea ting a North Korea n arrack depends 
very heavi ly on rhe em ploymen t of APLs. 
There arc no acceptable substi tu tes at 
present. Our use of landmines is based 
mainly on the th reat, the proximi ty o f 
the th reat, limi ted th reat attack warni ng 
and the terrain in this theater. The need for 
landmines will nor change wi thout a change 
in the terrain or the proximi ty of either 
the th reat or the enemy, unless we success-
fu lly find a viable, fully fielded al ternative. 
Eliminating NSDL will tip the bal-
ance in favor of human itarian co ncern 
over m ilitary effectiveness that cou ld pro-
duce drastic resul ts fo r U.S. and RO K 
soldiers as well as Ko rean non-combat-
ants. We must all remain mindful of the 
President's sta temen t in POD 64: "The 
DoD will ensu re that alternative tech-
no logies provide comparable m il ita ry ef-
fect iveness, safety of usc, a nd minimal 
risks to non-comb atants". 
Summary and Conclusion 
NSDLs have helped to p roduce 
peace and securi ty in the past 50 years. 
T here have been no civil ian, American , 
o r RO K casualties as a resul t o f these 
landmines. NSDLs are also m ilitarily ef-
fective and cost-effective. In keeping the 
peace, the United States and the Repub-
lic of Korea are responsible for meeting 
war-figh ting requ irements to stop an in-
vasion by the North. To that end, they 
provide a deterrent effect to in vasion, and 
a continual protection, which is needed 
to keep the peace. The alternat ives to 
NSDLs are m uch costlier, less effective, 
ill suited and would not con tribute to 
eliminating any deaths. 
Land m ines used by respo nsible gov-
ernments in monito red m ilita ry s itua-
tions are an effective method o f ach iev-
ing peace withou t producing casualties 
to non-combatants. U.S. policy of using 
landmines has produced safer, humani-
rarian results in Ko rea. Once South and 
North Ko rea unite under one governmenr, 
landmines can become a thing of rhe past 
in this area. The United States would in 
all likelihood help to dem ine these field s, 
as it has been doing all over the world 
with irs demin ing p rograms. It has con-
tributed more than $500 mi ll ion to elim i-
nate land m ines in 35 countries over the 
past I 0 yea rs. Unti l then, it is necessary 
that bo th the United Stares and ROK 
continue to use landmines to defend the 
integrity of South Korea and irs ci tizens, 
whi le giving t he m aximum protectio n to 
U.S. and ROKsoldiers and increasing rhe 
probabili ty o f m iss ion success, which is 
peace between the rwo Koreas. • 
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lr has also ser dead lines for the Department of 
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20 I 0," (Troxell 2000). . 
4 "LT GEN Maxwell Taylo r, Co mm and i ng 
General Eighrh U.S. Army o n rhc occasion of the 
27 J u ly I 953 Armistice signing St31e d : 'There is 
no occasion for celebra tion or boisterous conduct. 
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